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Abstract 
 
We examine whether the three-point rule—the increase in rewards 
for a win from two- to three points that FIFA adopted in 1995—
makes Bundesliga games become more exciting. Using regression 
discontinuity design as the empirical strategy, we do not find 
evidence that the three-point rule makes games more decisive, 
increases the number of goals, or decreases goal differences. We 
only find some evidence that the three-point rule increases the 
second-half goals of losing first-half teams. Overall, our results 
suggest that, in the case of Bundesliga games, the three-point rule 
does not work as FIFA intended. 
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Introduction 
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) adopted the three-point rule, raised 
the rewards for a win from two- to three points, in 1995 to make soccer games more exciting. 
The extra point, FIFA hoped, would induce teams to play more aggressively. Teams would 
abandon overly defensive plays; they would attempt to score more goals; games would 
become more decisive; and fans would crowd stadiums or be glued to their TV screens 
watching exciting soccer games.1  
 The literature is, however, mixed on whether the three-point rule works. Brocas and 
Carrillo (2004), for example, theoretically show teams may play more defensively under the 
three-point rule; Haugen (2008), on the other hand, shows the opposite. Empirical findings 
also vary by sample of games, measure of outcomes, type of competitions, and empirical 
strategy. Dilger and Geyer (2009), for example, using difference-in-differences, find the 
three-point rule decreases the probability of tied games in Bundesliga games. But, Guedes 
and Machado (2002), using regression control strategy, find the three-point rule does not 
affect teams’ offensive moves in the Portuguese first division league except those of 
underdog teams. Moreover, the direct effects are not as intended: Underdog teams become 
more defensive. 
 Two concerns complicate the estimation of the effects of the three-point rule. One, the 
theoretical effects of the three-point rule may be subtle—they may vary by the phase of 
games or the interim results, which mean the results may also vary by measure of outcomes 
(Brocas and Carrillo, 2004; Guedes and Machado, 2002; Haugen, 2008). Two, more 
importantly, it is difficult to ensure that games under the three-point rule are compared with 
                                                          
1
 The English Football League is the first to introduce the three-point rule in the 1981-82 season to 
woo fans back to the games after the league saw crowds dwindled by almost half compared to the 
game’s highpoint in the 1950s. FIFA has also applied the three-point rule since the 1994 World Cup 
in the US to reduce the probability of tied games, which FIFA feared would not sit well with the US 
audiences.                       
3 
 
the right control group; if not, the counterfactuals and the estimates of the effects will be 
biased. 
 This paper contributes to the literature by addressing the above two issues. One, we 
analyze the Bundesliga whose game archives are rich in detail and publicly available, which 
we use to create various measures of outcomes such as goal differences in decisive first-half 
games or the number of goals by winning or losing first-half teams, in addition to the widely 
used outcomes such as the number of goals and whether games are decisive. Two, we use 
regression discontinuity (RD) design as the empirical strategy: We compare games around 
the time when FIFA adopted the three-point rule in 1995—games that, we argue, are similar 
except for the three-point rule. The RD design, hence, provides good counterfactuals to which 
we compare games under the three-point rule, which mean our estimates eschew omitted 
variable bias problem unlike those from regression control strategy, difference-in-differences, 
or fixed effects models. Unlike these empirical strategies, the RD design excludes the effects 
of other changes in the rules of the game (e.g., back-pass rule or offside rule) or those of 
characteristics of the games (e.g., tactical evolutions, ball technology, or international player 
mobility) during the period of analysis so that we can attribute observed outcome differences 
at the time of the rule change in 1995 to the three-point rule.  
We do not find evidence that the three-point rule makes Bundesliga games more 
decisive, increases the number of goals, or decreases goal differences. The only statistically 
significant result we find is that the three-point rule increases the second-half goals of losing 
first-half teams. Overall, our results suggest that, in the case of Bundesliga games, the three-
point rule does not work as FIFA intended. 
We proceed as follows. We review the literature and describe the empirical strategy 
and data in the next two sections. Then, we discuss the results. The last section concludes.  
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Literature Review  
Theoretically, the effects of the three-point rule are subtle. Guedes and Machado (2002), for 
example, show that the effects of the three-point rule may vary by the relative strength of 
teams in matches. If the two teams in a match are equally strong (or equally weak), the three-
point rule induces more offensively plays. Underdog teams, however, may play more 
defensively under the three-point rule if the opponents are strong.  
Brocas and Carrillo (2004) argue that the effects of the three-point rule depend on the 
dynamics of games: They show that, unlike the two-point rule, the three-point rule induces 
teams to play more offensively in the second half compared to the first half. However, if 
games are tied, the three-point rule induces teams to play more offensively, but only towards 
the end of the games. Moreover, under some conditions, the new rule also induces teams to 
play more defensively early in games. On average, therefore, the three-point rule makes 
teams play more defensively. Haugen (2008), however, shows that teams do not play more 
defensively under the three-point rule. If anything, they play more offensively, which mean 
that, overall, the three-point rule leads to more offensive plays.2 
Some empirical papers show the three-point rule works. Moschini (2010), for 
example, finds that, using fixed-effects models of games in 35 countries over 30 years, the 
three-point rule increases the number of goals and decreases the probability of tied games. 
His analyses by country show that the three-point rule in many non-European countries 
makes games more exciting, but in European countries the magnitude of the effects are 
smaller and in some cases the signs are the opposite.3 Aylott and Aylott (2007) find that, in 
league games in seven countries, the number of goals increases in two to three years after the 
                                                          
2
 Haugen (2008) also finds the three-point rule leads to greater competitive imbalance among teams.                              
3
 The effects of the three-point rule on the number of goals for Germany, Austria, and the Czech 
Republic, in particular, are negative and statistically significant. 
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rule change except in Germany.4 An “exciting index”, which they define as a function of the 
number of goals and whether games are decisive, also increases in all countries although it 
levels off after four to five years. Dilger and Geyer (2009) also find that, using difference-in-
differences, the Bundesliga’s fraction of tied games and goal differences in decisive games 
decrease after FIFA adopted the three-point rule.    
However, some other papers show mixed results. Guedes and Machado (2002), for 
example, find that, in the Portuguese first division league, the three-point rule affects the 
offensive moves of underdog teams only: Underdog teams become more defensive. 
Palacious-Huerta (2004), who analyzes the structural breaks in the English league games 
during the period of 1982-1996, finds that the three-point rule and the back-pass rule affect 
the variability of goals, but not their averages. 
We want to provide a more convincing empirical evidence of the effects of three-
point rule: Following Dilger and Geyer (2009), we examine Bundesliga games to see whether 
their favorable results are robust to the use of an RD design as the empirical strategy. 
Perhaps, the RD design would provide a better control group for the games under the three-
point rule than Dilger and Geyer’s (2009) control group, i.e., the German Cup games, which 
may have different characteristics than those of Bundesliga games. We also see the fractions 
of tied games in Bundesliga and Cup games diverge before the rule change, which may 
compromise the use of difference-in-difference or fixed-effects models as the empirical 
strategy.5 Moreover, after FIFA adopted the three-point rule, the fraction of tied games in the 
Bundesliga does not decline immediately while the fraction of tied games in Cup games 
increases for some reasons over time, which mean the favorable results that Dilger and Geyer 
(2009) identify may be driven by games played long after the rule change, not necessarily by 
the three-point rule only.  
                                                          
4
 The leagues are in Albania, Brazil, England, Germany, Poland, Romania, and Scotland. 
5
 See Figure 1 in Dilger and Geyer (2009). 
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Empirical Strategy and Data 
Empirical Strategy 
We use regression discontinuity (RD) design to identify the effects of the three-point rule on 
whether soccer games become more exciting. Winners in the 1994-95 or earlier seasons get 
two points; those in the 1995-96 or later seasons three points. There is, therefore, a 
deterministic and discontinuous treatment of wins—the points awarded to winners—between 
the 1994-95 and 1995-96 seasons, which fits an RD design.6 
Identification relies on the plausible assumption that characteristics of games, players 
and teams—the skills sets of players, coaches’ philosophy of plays, teams’ popularity and 
finances, stadiums’ size and shape, and so on—around the discontinuity in the 1994-95 and 
1995-96 seasons are similar on average. Most players play in both seasons; most coaches 
coach the same teams in both seasons; most teams play in both seasons. The rules of play are 
also identical except for the three-point rule. Therefore, if we see discontinuities in some 
measures of outcomes between the 1994-95 and 1995-96 seasons, we can attribute the 
discontinuities to the three-point rule. 
Formally, we estimate the effects of the three-point rule using the following 
regression 
   =  +  + 	

 +  +  (1) 
where yi is a measure of outcome of game i such as whether game i is decisive or the number 
of goals scored in the game; D is an indicator equals one for games in the 1995-96 or later 
seasons, it equals zero otherwise; f(season) is a polynomial function of season, the 
assignment variable; X is a vector of control variables such as the round the game is played 
                                                          
6
 The RD design is proposed by Thistlethwaite and Campell (1960). Many papers in economics have 
used this empirical strategy in the past decade or so (Dunning, 2012). See van der Klaaw (2008), 
Imbens and Lemieux (2008), and Lee and Lemieux (2010) for reviews of this literature.  
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and the identities of home and away teams; and ε is the error term. In the basic specifications 
we use the quartic polynomial function of season, though in some specifications we also use 
its cubic or quintic function. As part of robustness checks, we use round instead of season as 
the assignment variable. Because the data fits an RD design, we do not have to include X in 
Equation (1)—its inclusion would not change the estimate of β; but, we do include the vector 
of control variable X in some specifications to increase the precision of the estimate. 
The coefficient of interest is that of D. If the three-point rule makes games more 
exciting, we expect β to be positive in regressions whose dependent variable is the number of 
goals or whether games are decisive. We expect it to be negative in regressions of goal 
differences (because lopsided games are boring). Along the lines of Brocas and Carrillo’s 
(2004) results, we expect β to be positive (negative) in regressions of second-half goals of 
losing (winning) first-half teams. 
 
Data 
We get the data from Deutcher Fussball-Bund, which archives Bundesliga games since the 
1960s.7 We use games played during the period of fifteen years before and after the 1995-96 
season, i.e., the 1980-2010 seasons. The sample includes 9,560 games played in 31 seasons 
with 34 rounds each.8 
We create five sets of outcome measures: whether games are decisive, the number of 
goals, goal differences, second- and first-half comparisons, and second-half goals. We look at 
whether games are decisive, the number of goals, and goal differences because the objective 
of the three-point rule is to promote attacking plays, which lead to more decisive games, 
                                                          
7
 We download the data from http://www.dfb.de/index.php?id=320005 (retrieved 27 March 2013).  
8
 All seasons have 34 rounds except the 1991-92 season, the season after the German unification in 
1990. Two additional teams from East Germany compete in the Bundesliga that season, which 
expands the number of teams to twenty and requires a season of 38 games (WSC, 2010). The year 
after, the number of teams competing in the Bundesliga goes back to eighteen.   
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larger number of goals, and smaller goal differences. Further, to test some aspects of the 
theoretical predictions of the three-point rule by Brocas and Carrillo (2004), to see whether 
game dynamics change from the first- to the second half, we compare first- and second-half 
outcomes and examine second-half goals. 
We define decisive games (at half time and full time, for all games and for a sub-
sample of tied first-half games) equals one if a game is decisive and zero otherwise; number 
of goals equals the sum of goals scored in a game, both by home and away teams (we 
consider the number of goals in the first half, in the second half, and at full time); goal 
differences equals the absolute value of the difference between goals scored by the home and 
away teams (we consider goal differences in the first half, in the second half, at full time; we 
also look at goal differences in a sub-sample of decisive first-half games). We define second- 
and first-half comparisons equals the difference between the number of goals scored in the 
second half less that in the first half. Finally, we define second-half goals by a sub-sample of 
teams or games: second-half goals by winning first-half teams, by losing first-half teams, and 
in tied first-half games.  
The summary statistics in Table 1 presents mixed evidence on whether the three-point 
rule makes soccer more exciting. The fraction of decisive games in the 1995-2010 seasons at 
full time, for example, is higher than that in the 1980-1994 seasons, though the difference is 
insignificant statistically (Panel A). The number of goals declines on average after the 
adoption of the three-point rule (Panel B), so do goal differences (Panel C). Winning first-
half teams score more second-half goals, losing first-half teams score fewer goals in the 
second half, and the number of goals in tied first-half games decline (Panel D).  
<Insert Table 1 here> 
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Results 
The Number of Goals and whether Games are Decisive 
Graphs in Figure 1 illustrate the effects of the three-point rule on the number of goals and 
whether games are decisive. They plot the average number of goals or the fraction of decisive 
games by season. The vertical dash line indicates the discontinuity, the season after which the 
Bundesliga uses the three-point rule. The graphs also fit a quartic polynomial function of 
season, the assignment variable, that may jump between the 1994-95 and 1995-96 seasons. 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
  Teams score more goals and games are more decisive in the 1980s: The trend lines 
decline slightly. The trend lines seem to rise between the 1994-95 and 1995-96 seasons, 
which suggests the three-point rule increases the number of goals and makes games more 
decisive. The magnitude of the jumps is small, however, and they are also insignificant 
statistically. 
Table 2 confirms the trend lines in Figure 1. Teams score fewer goals under the three-
point rule as column (1) of Panel B shows. There is no evidence that the three-point rule 
increases the number of goals, however, once we control for the quartic polynomial of season 
(column (2)): The estimates are positive, but they are insignificant statistically with standard 
errors bigger than the estimates. We get similar results after we add round dummies and 
home- and away teams dummies (columns (3-4)). As we expect, because the data fits an RD 
design, the estimates are stable across the different specifications in columns (2-4). 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
  Not only that the estimates are insignificant statistically, the magnitude of the effects 
is also small. The number of goals in the first half, for example, increases by 0.02 goal, which 
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is about 1.6% increase. The increase in the number of goals in the second half is larger, 0.12 
goal (7%), which mean the three-point rule increases the number of goals in the second half 
by one goal in every eight games on average. Games do not become more decisive either. 
The fraction of decisive games at full time, for example, increases by only one percentage 
point (1%). The increase in the fraction of decisive games at half time is larger, however, 
about three percentage points (5%). Again, none of the estimates is significant statistically. 
 
Goal Differences 
Graphs in Figure 2 show the three-point rule does not seem to lower goal differences: The 
trend line does not fall between the 1994-95 and 1995-96 seasons. In fact, it rises for goal 
difference in the second half. All estimates seem to be insignificant statistically because of 
the large variations of the average differences.  
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
  Panel A of Table 3 shows that goal differences are smaller under the three-point rule 
(column (1)), but none of the estimates are significant statistically once we include the quartic 
polynomial of seasons in the regression (column (2)). The magnitude of the effects also 
remains similar when we include round dummies and home and away teams dummies 
(columns (3-4)). Again, the estimates are insignificant statistically, which mean that there is 
no evidence that the three-point rule decreases goal differences in the first half, in the second 
half, at full time, or in decisive first-half games.  
<Insert Table 3 here> 
  The small estimates mean the effects are probably indifferent from zero. The effects 
on goal differences in decisive first-half games in particular are very small, 0.1-0.2 
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percentage point. Only the estimates of the effects on goal differences in the second half are 
large, 0.13 goals (13%), though they are insignificant statistically. 
There is no evidence that the three-point rule reduces the difference between the 
number of goals in the second- and first half either (Panel B). The estimates are positive and 
large, 0.1 goal (24%), but insignificant statistically. 
 
Final Outcomes Given First-half Outcomes 
It is possible that the three-point rule induces teams to change their strategies given early 
outcomes of games. For example, teams may play more offensively in the second half if 
games are tied at the half (Brocas and Carrillo, 2004). A losing team in the later stages of a 
game may attack aggressively because it does not have much to lose; on the contrary, a 
winning team may play defensively to prevent equalizers to protect their lead.  
Graphs in Figure 3 illustrate the effects of the three-point rule on second-half goals by 
winning and losing teams as well as outcomes of tied first-half games. The trend lines seem 
to rise between the 1994 and 1995 seasons, which indicate the three-point rule induces teams 
to change their strategies later in games. 
<Insert Figure 3 here> 
Table 4 presents the estimates of the jumps. All RD estimates in columns (2-4) are 
positive, but only the effects on second-half goals by losing first-half teams are significant 
statistically. When we include season quartic polynomial in column (2) or the polynomial of 
round dummies in column (3), the estimate is significant at 5% level. When we include 
home- and away teams dummies further in column (4), it becomes significant at 1% level. 
The estimates are not large, but not trivial either, 0.12 goal (15%), which mean losing first-
half teams score one more goals in the second half in 8-9 games on average. 
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<Insert Table 4 here> 
While there is no evidence of winning first-half teams scoring more goals in the 
second half, there is also no evidence that they play more defensively either: The estimates 
are positive with standard errors about twice as large. Overall, there is no evidence that the 
three-point rule makes tied first-half games more decisive or that it increases second-half 
goals in tied first-half games. 
 
Robustness Checks 
We do some robustness checks. One, we examine a sub-sample of games in the second half 
of seasons only to focus on games that matter the most for teams that fight for the 
championship or those battling against relegation. Two, we use alternative polynomial of 
season. Three, we use round instead of season as the assignment variable to increase the 
similarity of games near the discontinuity in 1995. 
 Table 5 presents the estimates on key outcome measures using games in the second 
half of seasons only. Overall, the results are robust. There is no evidence that the three-point 
rule makes games more decisive or decreases goal differences. There is also no evidence that 
it induces winning first-half teams to play more defensively or increases the second-half 
goals in tied first-half games. Nonetheless, we do find some evidence that losing first-half 
teams score more goals in the second half; the estimates are similar to those in table 4 and 
significant statistically at 5% level when we includes round as well as home and away teams 
dummies in the regression (column (4) of row (5)). 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
Table 6 presents the estimates of the effects of the three-point rule using alternative 
function of season (cubic and quintic polynomial of season) in columns (1-2) and alternative 
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assignment variable, round, instead of season in columns (3-5). Overall, the basic results are 
robust. There is no evidence that the three-point rule makes games more decisive, increases 
the number goals, or decreases goal differences. However, we find some evidence that losing 
first-half teams score more second-half goals; the estimates are stable across the various 
specifications and are significant statistically at 5% level except when we use quintic 
polynomial of round (column (5) of row (5)). 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
 
Concluding Remarks 
There is no evidence that the three-point rule makes Bundesliga games become more 
decisive, increases the number of goals, or decreases goal differences. Most of the estimates 
are positive, which mean the three-point rule increases the fraction of decisive games (as we 
expect if the three-point rule works), the number of goals (as we expect), and goal differences 
(the opposite of what we expect); but, their magnitude is small, and none of the estimates is 
significant statistically.  
 However, there is some evidence that the three-point rule increases the second-half 
goals of losing first-half teams. The estimates are significant statistically and robust across 
various specifications. They are also large, about nine to twelve percentage points, which 
mean the three-point rule increases the second-half goals of losing first-half teams by 12-
15%.  
These results show no convincing evidence that the three-point rule makes soccer 
games more exciting. If anything, the three-point rule seems to induce losing teams to play 
more aggressively later in the games, which probably also mean that winning teams play 
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more defensively to preserve the lead. Not only that the three-point rule fails to increase the 
number of goals, but it also induces winning teams to play defensively to deny goals.  
It is likely, therefore, at the margin, the three-point rule makes stronger teams play 
conservatively earlier in games, and play defensively once they are leading.9 Weaker teams 
may play more aggressively if they are losing, though they may find it difficult to score goals 
because the leading, and usually stronger, teams play more defensively. 
 Our results differ from those of Dilger and Geyer (2009) who find that the three-point 
rule makes Bundesliga game more decisive and lowers goal differences. They use difference-
in-differences as their empirical strategy and the German Cup games as the control group to 
estimate the counterfactuals of Bundesliga games under the three-point rule. But, perhaps, 
these German Cup games are not the right control group. Besides, the implicit assumption of 
difference-in-differences that games in the treated- and control groups have the same trends 
may be unsatisfied. In contrast, our empirical strategy, the RD design, relies only on the 
assumption that the games near the discontinuity are similar. If the three-point rule works, we 
should see jumps of trend lines of game outcomes at the discontinuity in 1995. The fact that 
we do not perhaps indicates that the three-point rule does not make games more exciting. 
 Our results are, to some extent, in line with the theoretical predictions of Brocas and 
Carrillo (2004). We do not find statistically significant evidence that winning teams play 
more defensively later in games, but we do find that losing teams play more aggressively 
later in the games. 
 There are concerns that (1) the three-point rule does not affect teams’ behaviour 
immediately; (2) games further away from the discontinuity may not be comparable and, 
therefore, should be excluded from the analysis; and (3) the estimates are mostly insignificant 
because of the lack of power to reject the null hypotheses. If the first is true, it means the RD 
                                                          
9
 This interpretation is in line with Corral, Prieto-Rodríguez, and Simmons (2010) who find that 
winning teams are more likely to commit fouls under the three-point rule. 
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design would fail to capture the effects of the three-point rule. But, we see that the trend lines 
are flat throughout the period of analysis, which indicates that this worry is unwarranted. If 
the trend lines decline, mostly they do in the 1980s; the trend lines in the few years around 
the discontinuity are mostly flat. To address the second concern, we redo the analyses using 
fewer number of seasons around the discontinuity; we still find no evidence that the three-
point rule makes games more exciting, though the fewer the number of seasons we use, the 
lower the power will be. The third concern is legitimate, and there is no way for us to address 
it. But, we take comfort of the fact that we consistently find significant estimates of the 
effects of the three-point rule on the number of goals of losing first-half teams, which mean 
that the power of the tests in our analyses is perhaps sufficiently high. 
 Our results suggest that the three-point rule does not make Bundesliga games more 
exciting: It does not increase the number of goals, nor it makes games more decisive. It does 
not mean that the three-point rule does not work in other countries, however. Therefore, it 
would be interesting to apply the RD design to other leagues as well. If it turns out that the 
results are robust, perhaps leagues and FIFA should consider introducing more winning 
incentives in soccer games, such as penalty shoot-outs in the event of draws or the 
controversial golden goal rule, to make soccer games even more exciting.10   
 
 
  
                                                          
10
 The Norwegian First Division and the Major League Soccer in the US had experimented with these 
rules.  
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Figure 1  Decisive games and number of goals at half time and full time 
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Figure 2  Goal differences at half time and full time 
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Figure 3  Second-half goals and decisive games given first-half results 
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Table 1  Summary statistics 
   
Variable 1980-1994 
seasons 
1995-2010 
seasons 
1980-2010 
seasons 
A. Decisive games 
   
At half time 0.61 0.59 0.60 
 
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) 
At full time 0.72 0.74 0.73 
 
(0.45) (0.44) (0.44) 
In tied first-half games 0.74 0.77 0.75 
 
-0.44 -0.42 -0.43 
B. Number of goals 
   
In the first half 1.33 1.24 1.28 
 
(1.14) (1.10) (1.12) 
In the second half 1.78 1.62 1.70 
 
(1.36) (1.25) (1.31) 
At full time 3.11 2.86 2.98 
 
(1.83) (1.71) (1.77) 
C. Goal differences 
   
In the first half 0.84  0.80  0.82  
 
(0.85) (0.82) (0.84) 
In the second half 1.09  0.99  1.04  
 
(1.04) (0.93) (0.98) 
At full time 1.50  1.40  1.45  
 
(1.39) (1.22) (1.31) 
In decisive first-half games 2.08  1.88  1.98  
 
(1.21) (1.04) (1.13) 
D. Second- and first-half comparisons 
   
Number of goals 0.45 0.38 0.41 
 
(1.72) (1.62) (1.67) 
E. Second-half goals 
   
By winning first-half teams 1.05  0.91  0.98  
 
(1.07) (0.96) (1.02) 
By losing first-half teams 0.81 0.77 0.79 
 
(0.91) (0.88) (0.90) 
In tied first-half games 0.59 0.63 0.61 
 
(0.49) (0.48) (0.49) 
Notes:  The number in each cell is the mean. The figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
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Table 2  The number goals and whether the games are decisive 
  
    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Decisive games 
     
At half time (1) -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
  
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
At full time (2) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
  
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
B. Number of goals 
     
In the first half (3) -0.09* 0.02 0.01 0.02 
  
(0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
In the second half (4) -0.16** 0.11 0.11 0.12 
  
(0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
At full time (5) -0.25** 0.13 0.12 0.14 
  
(0.09) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) 
Controls 
     
Season quartic polynomial 
 
 
   
Round dummies 
 
  
  
Home- and away team dummies 
 
   
 
Notes:  The number in each cell is the estimate of three-point rule from a regression of a measure of outcome, 
which is listed on the left column, on three-point rule and a set of control variables listed at the bottom rows. 
Three-point rule of a game equals one if it is in the 1995 or later seasons; it equals zero otherwise. The figures in 
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by season. One and two stars indicate statistical significance at a 
level of five and one percent, respectively.The number of oberservations is about 9,560. 
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Table 3  Goal differences 
  
    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Goal differences 
     
In the first half (1) -0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 
  
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
In the second half (2) -0.10* 0.11 0.11 0.13 
  
(0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
At full time (3) -0.11* 0.04 0.04 0.03 
  
(0.05) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) 
In decisive first-half games (4) -0.19** 0.004 -0.001 0.002 
  
(0.04) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) 
B. Second- and first-half comparisons 
     
Number of goals (5) -0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 
  
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Controls 
     
Season quartic polynomial 
 
 
   
Round dummies 
 
  
  
Home- and away team dummies 
 
   
 
Notes:  The number in each cell is the estimate of three-point rule from a regression of a measure of outcome, 
which is listed on the left column, on three-point rule and a set of control variables listed at the bottom rows. 
Three-point rule of a game equals one if it is in the 1995 or later seasons; it equals zero otherwise. The figures in 
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by season. One and two stars indicate statistical significance at a 
level of five and one percent, respectively. The number of oberservations is about 9,560. 
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Table 4  Final outcomes given first-half outcomes 
  
    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Decisive games 
     
In tied first-half games (1) 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.05 
  
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
B. Second-half goals 
     
By winning first-half teams (2) -0.14** 0.04 0.03 0.05 
  
(0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
By losing first-half teams (3) -0.04 0.09* 0.09* 0.12** 
  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
In tied first-half games (4) 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.06 
  
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Controls 
     
Season quartic polynomial 
 
 
   
Round dummies 
 
  
  
Home- and away team dummies 
 
   
 
Notes:  The number in each cell is the estimate of three-point rule from a regression of a measure of outcome, 
which is listed on the left column, on three-point rule and a set of control variables listed at the bottom rows. 
Three-point rule of a game equals one if it is in the 1995 or later seasons; it equals zero otherwise. The figures in 
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by season. One and two stars indicate statistical significance at a 
level of five and one percent, respectively. The number of oberservations varies from 3,800 to 5,800. 
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Table 5  Using a sample of second half of seasons only 
  
    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Decisive games 
     
At full time (1) 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
  
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
In tied first-half games (2) 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.03 
  
(0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
B. Goal differences 
     
At full time (3) -0.12 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 
  
(0.06) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) 
C. Second-half goals 
     
By winning first-half teams (4) -0.16** 0.03 0.03 0.05 
  
(0.05) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
By losing first-half teams (5) -0.05 0.12 0.12 0.14* 
  
(0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) 
In tied first-half games (6) 0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.01 
  
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
Controls 
     
Season quartic polynomial 
 
 
   
Round dummies 
 
  
  
Home- and away team dummies 
 
   
 
Notes:  The number in each cell is the estimate of three-point rule from a regression of a measure of outcome, 
which is listed on the left column, on three-point rule and a set of control variables listed at the bottom rows. 
Three-point rule of a game equals one if it is in the 1995 or later seasons; it equals zero otherwise. The figures in 
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by season. One and two stars indicate statistical significance at a 
level of five and one percent, respectively. The number of oberservations varies from 2,000 to 4,800. 
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Table 6  Using alternative polynomial of season and using round as the assignment variable 
  
    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
A. Decisive games 
      
At full time (1) 0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.06 
  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
In tied first-half games (2) 0.07 0.003 0.08 0.08 0.01 
  
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
B. Goal differences 
      
At full time (3) 0.02 -0.23 0.03 0.04 -0.22 
  
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) 
C. Second-half goals 
      
By winning first-half teams (4) 0.04 -0.08 0.04 0.05 -0.07 
  
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) 
By losing first-half teams (5) 0.09* 0.09* 0.08* 0.09* 0.09 
  
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
In tied first-half games (6) 0.08 0.002 0.08 0.08 0.01 
  
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Controls 
      
Season cubic polynomial 
 
 
    
Season quintic polynomial 
 
 
 
   
Round cubic polynomial 
 
  
 
  
Round quartic polynomial 
 
   
 
 
Round quintic polynomial 
 
    
 
Notes:  The number in each cell is the estimate of three-point rule from a regression of a measure of outcome, which is listed 
on the left column, on three-point rule and a set of control variables listed at the bottom rows. Three-point rule of a game 
equals one if it is in the 1995 or later seasons; it equals zero otherwise. The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors 
clustered by season. One and two stars indicate statistical significance at a level of five and one percent, respectively. The 
adjusted R-squared is about; the number of oberservations varies from 3,800 to 9,650. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
